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NOTES AND COMMENTS
USE OF "DUE-ON" CLAUSES TO GAIN




Acceleration clauses, used to protect mortgage lenders from waste,
depreciation, and other risks tending to jeopardize a lender's security,
have long been popular.' An acceleration clause is a bargained-for
element of modem mortgages, promissory notes, and deeds of trust, re-
serving to the lender the option of declaring, upon the happening of
a stated event, the loan balance and accrued interest to be immediately
due and owing; in effect, to accelerate the maturity date of the loan.
This comment will discuss two of the many species of acceleration
clauses and their use by lenders to maintain lending portfolios at cur-
rent interest rates. These are the "due-on-sale" clause, triggered when
the borrower sells the loan security without the lender's approval, and
the "due-on-encumbrance" clause, whose triggering event is the giving
of a junior encumbrance by the borrower without the lender's consent.'
In illustrating a lender's use of a "due-on" clause the following
pre-litigation events are typical: borrower and lender enter into a mort-
gage agreement containing a "due-on" clause;3 without lender's permis-
1. Luke v. Patterson, 192 Okla. 631, 139 P.2d 175 (1943).
2. Other common triggering events are failure to pay a monthly installment when
due and failure to pay property taxes.
3. Lenders often include an acceleration provision in the note as well as the mort-
gage but that may not always be necessary. See Am. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Blomquist,
21 Utah 2d 289, 445 P.2d 1 (1968); holding that a note and mortgage, though separate
instruments, are not separate contracts; but, being executed at the same time, constitute
1
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sion, borrower conveys or encumbers the property; lender may now ex-
ercise the acceleration option, declare the balance of the debt due, and
foreclose to enforce this choice, or, as usually happens, the lender may
agree to waive his acceleration right upon payment to the lender by
the assuming vendee of an assumption fee or upon vendee's agreement
to assume the mortgage at the higher current interest rate.
The traditional purpose of "due-on" clauses, and in times of stable
interest rates the only purpose, has been to protect the lender's inter-
est "in maintaining the direct responsibility of the parties on whose
credit the loan was made."4 This is a form of debtor-selection reduc-
ing the moral risks of waste and depreciation which could accompany
a conveyance to a third party vendee with a questionable credit rating,
or with a poor reputation for home maintenance and upkeep. 5 Be-
cause the lender has a legitimate interest in maintaining the value of
the security, all jurisdictions allow enforcement of "due on" clauses to
prevent such a third party from being forced upon the lender.6
However, with the advent of run-away inflation, accompanied by
unprecedentedly high interest rates,7 "due-on" clauses have begun to
a single contract, and acceleration provisions in the mortgage operate on the note the
same as upon the mortgage itself and mature the note for all purposes.
The following is a typical acceleration clause:
If all or any part of the property or an interest therein is sold or transferred
by Borrower without Lender's prior written consent, excluding (a) the creating
of a lien or encumbrance subordinate to this Mortgage, (b) the creation of a
purchase money security interest for household appliances, (c) a transfer by
devise, descent or by operation of law upon the death of a joint tenant or (d)
the grant of any leasehold interest of three years or less not containing an op-
tion to purchase, Lender may at Lender's option, declare all the sums secured
by this Mortgage to be immediately due and payable. Lender shall have
waived such option to accelerate if, prior to the sale or transfer, Lender and
the person to whom the property is to be sold or transferred reach agreement
in writing that the credit of such person is satisfactory to Lender and that the
interest payable on the sums secured by this Mortgage shall be at such rate
as Lender shall request.
4. Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505, 392 P.2d 265
(1964).
5. Hetiand, Real Property and Real Property Security: The Well-Being of the
Law, 53 CALn'. L. REV. 151, 165-67, 170 (1965).
6. Cherry v. Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135
(2d Dist. 1969), holding: Lenders ran the risk that the security may depreciate in value,
or be totally destroyed. This risk of loss is reduced in the lender's viewpoint if the bor-
rower is known to be conscientious, experienced and able. Often as here, a trust deed
requires the borrower to maintain the property in good repair, secure and keep adequate
insurance in force, satisfy liens, taxes and other encumbrances and in other ways to pro-
tect the security. If a borrower were able to sell the security without concern for the
debt, he may take the proceeds of the sale, leaving for parts unknown, and the new
owner of the property might permit it to run down and depreciate. Thus the lender
places some value on his belief that the person who takes out the loan is reliable and
responsible. A lender may indeed be willing to loan to some persons or entities at one
rate of interest but to other, less desirable risks only at an increased interest rate.
7. An excellent presentation of the inflation/interest rate roller coaster appears in
Bonanno, Due on Sale and Prepayment Clauses in Real Estate Financing in California
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serve a second and equally vital function for the lender-that of helping
to maintain the lending portfolio at current interest rates through the
lender's ability to renegotiate interest rates upward upon a sale or en-
cumbrance. However, unlike the uniform enforceability accorded
"due-on" clauses when used to protect the security, use of "due-on"
clauses to produce the collateral benefits of increased interest rates
have met with conflicting treatment in the state courts. Before looking
at the reported cases of specific jurisdictions, however, a discussion of
the economic facts of life currently facing savings and loan associations
and other mortgage lenders is necessary, including a discussion of how
"due-on" clauses ameliorate the often drastic consequences of a tight
money supply and rapidly increasing interest rates.
A 1970 study reported that:
[The basic dilemma of the savings association business is
an inability to adjust earnings upward during periods of in-
flation accompanied by rising interest rates. This dilemma
is traced to the fact that the great bulk of liabilities of the
business continues to be virtually demand obligations while
the average actual life of its principal assets-real estate
mortgage loans-is approximately eight to ten years.'
Clearly, if a borrower were able to pass on to a vendee the borrower's
low interest rate without interference by the lender, all mortgages
would continue at that rate until their original maturity date. The ef-
fect of this increased payoff time over the current average actual payoff
time of eight to ten years would be to freeze a lender's income at un-
profitable levels for twenty to thirty years.9
In order to compensate for the earnings lost on these low interest
loans a savings and loan association would be forced either to make
a series of loans with shorter maturity periods allowing for renegotia-
tion of rates at the end of each renewable period or to initially charge
higher rates in anticipation of, and as protection against, the possibility
of rising rates in the future. Short-term loans would also increase
monthly payments, thus making the obtaining of such loans prohibitive
to many people. 10
In addition to reducing the payoff time of mortgages with the ac-
in Times of Fluctuating Interest Rates-Legal Issues and Alternatives, U.S.F.L. Rav.
267-270 (1972).
8. United States League of Savings & Loan Associations, RECOMMENDATONS OF
THE COMMITTEE ON SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS NEEDS, (1970).
9. LEGAL BULL.: THE Liw AFFECTING SAvINGS ASSOCIATIONS, vol. 36 No. 5, Ac-
celeration of Mortgage Debt for Unapproved Sale of 6ecurity Property, 478 (Sept.
1970).
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companying opportunity for interest rate re-evaluation and adjustment,
use of "due-on" clauses tends to spread the cost of money, at least to
the extent sales occur, to all borrowers and not just to those who borrow
when rates are high. The California Supreme Court cited this argu-
ment in favor of "due-on' clauses noting:
To permit the lender to accelerate ensures that all buyers of
property must finance at the current interest rate, and that
none obtain an advantage because of the fortuitous fact -that
the seller originally purchased during a period of low interest
rates.1 '
Porfessor Bonanno, in an article generally critical of "due-on' clauses 2
cites a Wall Street Journal articleI3 pointing out that new borrowers in
early 1970 were being charged 9% to make up for those paying 4%
on loans that had been in existence for a few years.14 This would indi-
cate that the real estate brokers' arguments against "due-on" clauses
as inhibitors of home sales are misplaced. While it is true that the
prospect of having to assume a mortgage at a rate higher than the bor-
rower/vendor's may deter some potential vendees from buying, it ap-
pears that the "due-on" clauses have actually played a part in holding
down overall rates. In addition, upon assumption the lender will often
accept less than the current rate, usually, lower by 1/4 %. Certain sav-
ings and loans even go so far as to split the difference between the
current market rate and the rate required by the note, thereby giving
the assuming vendee some advantage over new borrowers.'5
Now consider the liquidity crisis. n attempting to better compete
with the short-term money markets and stem the outflow of funds from
the savings and loan associations to short-term investments,' 6 the
11. La Sala v. Am. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 880, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 859,
489 P.2d 1113, 1123 (1971) (note 17 by the court).
12. Supra note 7, at 302.
13. Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 1970, at 14, col. 3.
14. See speech by Stuart Davis, Chairman of the Board & Chief Executive Officer
of Great Western Savings & Loan Association, Nov. 13, 1974, to Annual Convention
of the United States League of Savings & Loan Associations, entitled: The Variable In-
terest Rate Mortgage, which stated in part:
Loans made in Dec. 1965, had an average effective yield of 5.92%. After we
had paid the average cost of money and our operating expenses, we had a net
margin of 47 cents per $100 on loans made that month. But when the money
crunch hit in 1966, this margin quickly eroded. By the middle of the crunch
it had dropped to 19 cents per $100. But. . . the end of the money crunch
did not signal the end of the erosion in the margin on the Dec. 1965 loans.
By the next year, 1971, the margin on those loans was a negative 66 cents per
$100. Today we are losing more than $1.75 on each $100 loaned in 1965,
still held in our portfolio.
15. Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, - Colo. -, 509 P.2d 1240, 1245
(1973).
16. Net savings outflow (i.e. negative savings or negative net inflow), considering
all operating savings and loan associations, was experienced in the months of April, July,
1975]
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savings and loan associations increase dividends to accountholders
for money on deposit. One example would be the offering of 7-%
savings certificates in July of 1973. If mortgage rates remain fixed
throughout the loan period without any chance to increase rates upon
a sale or an encumbrance, then any increase in dividend rates reduces
the amount of money available for loans while increasing the cost of
money to the savings and loan association. This increased cost of
money is passed on to new borrowers, again tending to force interest
rates upward. 7 "Due-on" clauses provide the essential safety valve;
the lender's portfolio is kept closer to current rates and liquidity is im-
proved.
Continuing with the attempt to evaluate the essential function of
"due-on" clauses from the lender's perspective, one final and highly co-
gent argument remains. The California Court of Appeals has recog-
nized that:
[Moan agreements frequently permit a borrower to pay off
a loan before it is due. When interest rates are high, a
lender runs the risk they will drop and that the borrower will
refinance his debt elsewhere at a lower rate and pay off the
loan, leaving the lender with money to loan, but at a less fav-
orable interest rate. On the other hand, when money is
loaned at low interest, the lender risks losing the benefit of
a later increase in rates. As one protection against the fore-
going contingency, a due-on-sale clause is employed permit-
ting acceleration of -the due date by the lender so that he may
take advantage of rising interest rates in the event his bor-
rower transfers the security.' 8
The preceding discussion hopefully has equipped the reader with
enough of the background theories and arguments so that critical evalu-
ation of recent cases is possible. The lender's interest in litigating
"due-on" clauses has been shown. Borrowers and buyers litigate the
validity of these clauses because a borrower/vendor can obviously sell
his house at a higher price if he can pass along to his vendee a low
interest rate mortgage. Predictably, case law on such an important is-
sue varies widely.
STATE LAW DEVELOPMENTS
The first group of jurisdictions, comprising the minority view, fol-
and August for the period January-October 1974 alone, as reported in Table S.4.3. of
the FEDBRAL HomE LOAN BANK BD. JouRNAL, December 1974, at 27.
17. Supra note 14.
18. Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135,
138 (2d Dist. 1969).
[Vol. 10:590
5
Ashley: Use of Due-on Clauses to Gain Collateral Benefits: A Common-Sense
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1974
"DUE-ON-SALE" CLAUSES
lows a "strict equity" line of reasoning. Arizona, Arkansas and Florida
represent this group.19
The leading case is Baltimore Life Insurance Co. v. Ham,20
wherein the assignee of the mortgage, upon borrowers' action in agree-
ing to sell the property without approval, exercised the acceleration op-
tion and brought suit to foreclose. At trial, plaintiff's suit was dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The ap-
pellate court, however, found that the agreement to sell was a convey-
ance within the scope of the acceleration clause entered into between
the parties, but held that that in itself was insufficient to require relief.
Defendant/borrower contended that the clause restrained alienation,
was unenforceable and was against public policy.
Recognizing that acceleration clauses were bargained-for elements
of mortgage transactions designed to protect a lender's legitimate inter-
est of insuring that a responsible party is in possession, the appellate
court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's action, stating its
major considerations as follows:
An action to accelerate and foreclose a mortgage being
an equitable proceeding [citation omitted] it is not enough
to allege merely that the acceleration clause has been vio-
lated. Absent an allegation that the purpose of the clause
is in some respect being circumvented or that the mortgag-
ee's security is jeopardized, a plaintiff cannot be entitled to
equitable relief. Otherwise -the equitable powers of the trial
court would be invoked to impose an extreme penalty on a
mortgagor with no showing that he has violated the substance
of the agreement, that is, that he would not make a convey-
ance that would impair the security.21
By so holding, this court repudiated use of "due-on" clauses for any
purpose other than that of protecting a lender from having an unsuit-
able vendee forced upon him. The opinion presupposes that the only
purpose for including such a clause, and the only purpose within the
contemplation of the parties, is to reduce the lender's moral risks. To
give binding authority to such a presupposition is unwise, for if acceler-
ation clauses are truly bargained-for their use to increase the interest
rate, as provided by the acceleration clause, could easily be within the
contemplation of both parties.
19. See Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971);
Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972); Clark
v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. App. 2d Dist. 1970).
20. 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971).
21. Id. at 193.
1975]
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One year later, the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the Ham
rationale in the case of Tucker v. Pulaski Federal Savings & Loan As-
sociation.22 Borrower/appellant Tucker's unauthorized sale of the mort-
gaged property prompted Pulaski to accelerate and foreclose. Tucker's
answer alleged that the acceleration was capricious, oppressive, arbi-
trary, and an unconscionable restraint on his right to freely convey the
equity of redemption in the mortgaged property, and that the provision
was invalid and void.
In holding for Pulaski, the trial court found the acceleration clause
valid and not against public policy; that plaintiff had validly exercised
its right to accelerate; that plaintiff had no obligation to justify its refusal
to consent to the sale of the property; that plaintiff had valid business
reasons for withholding its consent; and that plaintiff was entitled to
foreclose. Of the four points relied upon by the Arkansas Supreme
Court in reversing, only one is relevant to this discussion. It was error
to permit the acceleration, the court held, because the acceleration pro-
vision "is against public policy and void."'23  Following several lengthy
quotations from Ham, the court declares:
[A] mortgagor could be transferred from his job to another
location and, if persons to whom he desired to sell the prop-
erty could be arbitrarily disapproved by the loan company,
he could be in the position of being forced to sell to someone
at great sacrifice. This could well be true even though a loan
might be three-fourths paid.24
As in Ham, the lender failed to allege jeopardy to the security because
of the sale and in the absence of such a showing, Arkansas joined Ari-
zona in holding acceleration clauses unenforceable. 25  Both states,
though for different reasons, failed to enforce "due-on" clauses when
used to increase interest rates. Implicit in each decision is the view
that "due-on" clauses may be invoked only to protect the lender against
a borrower's substitution of an unsuitable debtor in his place.
In sharp contrast to the "strict equity" decisions are the decisions
22. 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972).
23. 481 S.W.2d at 727.
24. Id. at 729.
25. The Florida Court of Appeals has held that a mortgage foreclosure is an equity
matter and that a mortgagee has a right to accelerate on the default of the mortgage
conditions only if they are necessarily related to the preservation of the security. A
Florida court will refuse to enter a foreclosure judgment when the acceleration of the
due date would be unconscionable and its result would be inequitable and unjust. Clark
v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583, (Fla. App. 2d Dist. 1970).
[Vol. 10:590
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of California, Wisconsin, Colorado and Tennessee.2" These states fol-
low the majority rule, characterized by a reduced emphasis on equity
principles, a clear perception of the need for accommodating both legal
precepts and economic realities, and a willingness automatically to ac-
cord validity and enforceability to "due-on' clauses, even if used solely
to raise interest rates.
One of the earliest cases to discuss "due on" clauses as interest-
raising devices was Cherry v. Home Savings & Loan Association,27 a
California case. This was a declaratory judgment action brought by the
borrower's vendee, who had attempted to purchase the property "sub-
ject to" borrower's mortgage and at borrower's low rate of interest.
Lender refused to consent to the sale unless Cherry, the vendee, would
"assume" the indebtedness at the current higher interest rate. 28
Though the "due-on" clause was challenged on every relevant ground,
none was found to have merit. The court found the clause to be clear
and unambiguous, so the central issue for consideration was whether the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, implied in law in every
contract, requires a lender to exercise reasonableness in giving or with-
holding its consent prior to declaring the debt accelerated. This question
was answered in the negative:
[I]mplied covenants are not favored by the law; and courts
will declare the same to exist only where there is a satis-
factory basis in the express contract of the parties which
makes it necessary to imply certain duties and obligations in
order to effect the purposes of the parties to the contract
made. 9
Vendee's final argument, that the "due-on-sale" clause constituted
an invalid restraint on alienation, had already been litigated and re-
jected in California in the case of Coast Bank v. Minderhout.30 Coast
Bank did not concern a mortgage or deed of trust but simply an agree-
ment between the parties, filed in the land records, reserving to the
bank acceleration rights if the borrower should "transfer, sell, hypothe-
cate, or assign . . . said real property." Justice Traynor's majority
opinion found the agreement sufficient to create a security interest in
26. This is not intended to be a complete list of all states which enforce the due-
on clause to secure collateral benefits.
27. 267 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (2d Dist. 1969).
28. Lender also requested a $471 assumption fee which Cherry ultimately paid
though under protest.
29. Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135,
139 (2d Dist. 1969).
30. 61 Cal. 2d 311, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505, 392 P.2d 265, 266 (1964).
1975]
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the property, but more importantly he held that the clause was not a
restraint or alienation:
The view that the common-law rule against restraints on
alienation prohibits all such restraints has been forcefully crit-
icized on the ground that it loses sight of the purposes of the
rule and needlessly invalidates reasonable restraints designed
to protect justifiable interests of the parties.3 1
The not-an-invalid-restraint language of Coast Bank has been
sharply criticized as extraneous and confusingly dangerous dicta by op-
ponents of "due-on" clauses who have argued that the case should have
been decided in favor of the bank on the more concrete ground that
borrower's promissory note securing the mortgage was past due and
therefore in default when the suit was instituted. 2 Be this as it may,
the argument is now acedemic, for Coast Bank has been followed by
an unbroken line of cases, each reaffirming the Coast Bank "dicta.""8
Cherry's lasting significance rests with its lucid language recogniz-
ing the value of "due-on' clauses both in maintaining the borrower's
responsibility for the security14 and in protecting the lender from the
drastic effects of rapidly increasing interest rates by giving the lender
a means of updating the lending portfolio. 5 Cherry established an au-
tomatic enforcement rule for "due-on" clauses, allegations of jeopardy
to the security being unnecessary.
Despite growing dissatisfaction with acceleration clauses among
real estate brokers and home owners no case reached the California
Supreme Court until 1971, when, ironically, interest rates had begun
to ease from a peak in 1970. The case was La Sala v. American Sav-
ings & Loan Association,36 a class action seeking a declaration that ac-
celeration based upon borrower's execution of a junior encumbrance
was invalid. After addressing several class action related challenges
31. Id. at 268.
32. The following articles are either critical of the Coast Bank decision specifically
or are critical of "due-on" clauses generally: Bonanno, supra note 7; Valensi, The Due-
On Sale Clause: A Dissenting Opinion, L.A. BAR BULL. 121 (1970); Comment, Apply-
ing the Brakes to Acceleration Clauses: Controlling Their Misuse in Real Property Se-
cured Transactions, 9 CAL. W=sr. L. RFv. 514 (1973); Comment, The Case for Relief
from Due-on-Sale Provisions, 22 HAsT. L.J 431; Comment, Is the Practice of Raising
the Interest Rate In Return for Not Exercising an Acceleration Clause on Assumption
of a Mortgage Illegal in Texas as a Restraint on Alienation?, 13 S. Tnx. L. REv. 296
(1972). See also Comment, Debtor-Selection Provisions Found in Trust Deeds and the
Extent of Their Enforceability in the Courts, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 475 (1962).
33. Hellbaum v. Lytton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 274 Cal. App. 2d 456, 79 Cal. Rptr.
9 (1969); Jones v. Sacramento Sv. & Loan Ass'n, 248 Cal. App. 2d 522, 56 Cal. Rptr.
741 (3d Dist. 1967); Wilson v. Inland Mfg. Co., Civ. No. 8636 (4th Dist. Cal., filed
Jan. 18, 1968).
34. Supra note 6.
35. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
36. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 489 P.2d 1113 (1971).
[Vol. 10:590
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which had resulted in the suit's dismissal in the trial court, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court announced that where enforcement of a "due-
on-encumbrance" clause is not reasonably necessary to protect security,
lender's use of the clause to exact collateral benefits is an unlawful re-
straint on alienation.
In support of its holding, the La Sala court reaffirmed Coast Bank,
holding that only unreasonable restraints on alienation are invalid, and
distinguished Cherry because it involved a sale not a junior encum-
brance. The court explained:
Thus, although California cases have clearly held "due-on-
sale" clauses valid, the language in such cases respecting "due-
on-encumbrance" provisions is .... entirely dictum.17
It further concluded that the justifications for "due-on-sale" clauses do
not apply with equal force to restraints against future encumbrances:
A sale of the property usually divests the vendor of any in-
terest in that property, and involves a transfer of possession,
with responsibility for maintenance and upkeep, to the vend-
ee. A junior encumbrance, on the other hand, does not
terminate the borrower's interests in the property, and rarely
involves a transfer of possession.
Continuing its reasoning in a footnote the court stated:
Acceleration upon sale of the property . . . does not ser-
iously restrict alienation because the sale terms can, and usu-
ally will, provide for payment of the prior trust deed.
A junior encumbrance . . . often represents only a
small fraction of the borrower's equity. . .; it does not often
provide the borrower with the means to discharge the bal-
ance secured by the trust deed. Thus, under a due-on-en-
cumbrance clause the borrower is exposed to a detriment
quite different than that involved in a sale.3 9
Some exceptions to the foregoing were admitted however. One ex-
ample would be a conveyance to a mortgage in possession, as that could
lead to waste and depreciation. A more important exception is where
the second lien is a guise to effect a sale of the property, as that will
sooner or later leave the borrower with little or no equity. Acceleration
in these situations is reasonably necessary to protect the lender's secur-
ity.
In summary then, the relevant holdings for which La Sala stands
are these:
37. Id. at 1122.
38. Id. at 1123.
39. Id. at 1123 n.17.
1975]
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(a) a lender's right to automatic enforceability of "due-
on-sale" clauses is upheld and reaffirmed because of
the necessity of protecting the security;
(b) the "due-on-encumbrance" clause can claim no mechan-
ical justification but may be used where the security
is truly endangered; and
(c) a second lien used as a guise to sell the property suffi-
ciently endangers the security to justify acceleration.
In La Sala the opponents of "due-on" clauses realized a partial victory,
but those who had hoped for relief from "due-on-sale" provisions re-
ceived a fatal setback.
La Saids bifurcated treatment of the two "due-on" provisions is
a necessary and logical refinement. A borrower in possession who ex-
ecutes a second lien not intended as a sale is protected from any inter-
est rate increases because the lender suffers no endangerment to the
security. Indeed, proceeds from the second lien may even be used to
improve the real estate, thus enhancing the lender's security. The essen-
tial fairness of the court's treatment is unassailable. It is therefore
all the more regrettable that the latest expression of the California
Supreme Court on this subject should have so completely perverted the
La Sala logic.
Tucker v. Lassen Savings & Loan Association,4 ° litigated this ques-
tion: whether a "due-on" clause contained in a promissory note or
deed of trust can be enforced simply because the borrower enters into
an installment land contract for the sale of the security? Unfortunately,
the court, sitting in bank, held that it could not. For the clause to be
enforceable the lender must demonstrate how the installment land con-
tract, entered into between the borrower and his vendee, impinges
upon the lender's legitimate interests to an extent justifying accelera-
tion.
Lassen's "due-on" clause clearly applied to cases of encumbrance.
The installment land contract involved here provided that the bor-
rower/vendor would retain legal title until the full purchase price was
paid, with vendees being entitled to immediate possession. Lender
threatened to accelerate unless the vendee agreed to assume the mort-
gage and to do so at the current rate of 94%, a substantial increase
over the 8% rate vendee had agreed to pay the borrower/vendor.
No impairment of or endangerment to lender's security was found
by the trial court, and it therefore concluded that lender's acceleration
40. - Cal. 3d -, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633, 526 P.2d 1169 (1974).
[Vol. 10:590
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was an unreasonable restraint on alienation. This holding, affirmed by
the Supreme Court of California, places in doubt much of what La Sala
stands for.
For example, La Sala recognized:
[A] sale of the property usually divests the vendor of any
interest in that property, and involves the transfer of possess-
ion, with responsibility for maintenance and upkeep, to the
vendee.41
In Tucker the vendees were in possession at the time of trial with the
borrower/vendor's interest being that of bare legal title. With each
month's installment, borrower's equity diminished, and with it diminished
borrower's interest in the vendee's reliability in maintaining the se-
cuitry. Nevertheless, the court held that automatic enforcement of
the clause was not justified because a junior encumbrance...
"does not terminate the borrower's interests in the property, and
rarely involves a transfer of possession. ' 42  Completely ignored
is La Sala's caveat that a second lien may be employed as a
guise to effect the sale of the property. In relying upon the technical
fact that the borrower/vendor retains legal title in an installment land
contract, the court refused to look through form to substance. Further,
the La Sala decision had approved of the practice of permitting a lender
to accelerate upon a sale to insure that all buyers of property must fi-
nance at the current rate, and that none obtain an advantage because
of the fortitous fact that his vendor originally purchased during a pe-
riod of low interest rates.43
In effect, the court now treats outright sales one way and sales
by installment land contract another. On the one hand the court allows
acceleration for an outright sale because of the security risks and be-
cause the lender has a legitimate interest in raising interest rates to cur-
rent levels; but, on the other hand, the court disallows use of accelera-
tion for installment land contracts, though that form of alienation is in-
tended as a sale, results in immediate possession by strangers with ac-
companying moral risks, and allows a vendee "to obtain an advantage
because of the fortuitous fact that his seller originally purchased during
a period of low interest. 44
Finally, throughout Tucker the court reaffirmed the basic tenet,
41. La Sala v. Am. Say. & Loan Assn, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 489 P.2d
1113, 1123 (1971).
42. Id. at 1123.
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first laid down in Coast Bank, that "it is not unreasonable for the lender
to condition its continued extension of credit to the [borrowers] on
their retaining their interest in the property that stood as security for
the debt."45 However, the only interest retained by a borrower/vendor
under an installment land contract is bare legal title, and that interest,
rather than being retained intact, is periodically diminished over time
until there is little and ultimately no equity left. If this bare legal title
is enough to fulfill Coast Bank's standards of borrower's interest, then
Tucker has emasculated that decision.
By placing undue importance upon the greater "quantum of re-
straint" a borrower/vendor experiences with an encumbrance rather
than a sale, and by reneging on La Sala's warning that an encumbrance
intended as a sale poses grave risks to a lender, the court upholds, in
the installment land contract, a method of transferring property to stran-
gers with accompanying moral risks while simultaneously denying to a
lender his most effective means of self-protection. 46 Absent the use
of an acceleration device in an installment land contract, the mortgage
will have a tendency to run until its full maturity date, and this will
mean an increase in the average payoff time of the lender's portfolio,
aggravating what was earlier referred to as the basic dilemma of savings
and loan associations. 47 Lenders will be forced to compensate for
whatever losses they sustain by having money loaned for longer periods
at sub-current rates by increasing the interest rates charged to new
borrowers. One group of mortgage consumers will pay artificially high
rates because of the court-sanctioned advantage accorded another group
of mortgage consumers, while La Salds expectation that "all buyers
must finance at the current rate" is forgotten.
It is this author's opinion that junior encumbrances which are in-
tended to and do transfer equitable title and immediate possession, and
which intend ultimately to convey legal title, should be accorded the
same automatic enforcement under "due-on-encumbrance" clauses that
lenders enjoy when the sale is outright. This "enlightened" treatment
of installment land contracts has been adopted in Wisconsin.
Mutual Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Wisconsin Wire
Works4S involved a land contract entered into by mortgagor/vendor
Wire Works and a vendee contrary to a prior mortgage agreement that
45. Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505, 508, 392 P.2d
265, 268 (1964).
46. Supra note 14 and accompanying text.
47. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
48. 58 Wis. 2d 99, 205 N.W.2d 762 (1973).
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Wire Works had with Mutual as mortgagee. When Mutual discovered
this land contract it elected to accelerate and foreclose. No mortgage
payments were delinquent, nor did Mutual allege waste or any appre-
hension of waste to the property. At trial, Mutual's "consent to trans-
fer" clause, with its acceleration provision, was found to be ambiguous
as it was unclear whether the restriction was intended to limit transfer
of equitable as well as legal title. Due to this ambiguity the borrower's
action did not constitute a conveying away, or a vesting of title in an-
other person, within the meaning of Mutuars clause. Mutual appealed.
In reversing the trial court's dismissal the court found the clause
was clear, not ambiguous, and broad enough to cover the transfer from
Wire Works to its vendee. Under Wisconsin's lien theory of mort-
gages, a mortgagee is merely a lienholder, while full ownership, both
legal and equitable, and full right of possession remains with the mort-
gagor. The land contract, by the process of equitable conversion,
transferred both an immediate right of possession and equitable title
to the vendee. Therefore, the court held that a land contract is a con-
veyance.
The court then reviewed Coast Bank and Cherry, citing with ap-
proval the concepts that a lender has a legitimate interest in maintain-
ing the interest of its borrower in the security. More importantly, La
Sala was cited to emphasize the possibility that a second lien can, in
certain instances, endanger the security of the first lien, thus posing the
"same dangers of waste and depreciation as would an outright sale."49
And finally, the court approved the language in Cherry to the effect
that "due-on-sale" clauses may be used by sensible lenders to take ad-
vantage of rising interest rates and thereby minimize risks.50
This review of the authorities must have convinced the court that
it is the degree of hazard to the security posed by a transfer rather than
the "quantum of restraint" imposed which is important. Looking
through form to substance the court held:
It is difficult to see, given the general policy behind a
"due-on-sale clause," why a transfer of land title by a land
contract does not pose the same potential hazard to the inter-
ests of the mortgagee as most other recognized types of con-
veyances.
We, accordingly, hold that a due-on-sale clause or in this
case, to use the terms of the mortgage note, "due. . .if. ..
49. La Sala v. Am. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 882, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 860,
489 P.2d 1113, 1124 (1971).
50. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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convey[ed] away . . . or if the title thereto shall become
vested in any other," is not against public policy and is en-
forceable as a contractual condition of the note and mort-
gage.51
Unlike the California court, the Wisconsin court construed "transfer of
title" to mean a transfer of legal or equitable title, either of which is
a sufficient triggering event. This decision in essence upholds the use
of "due-on-encumbrance' clauses when the encumbrance is intended
as a sale.
The final two decisions to be discussed are important for their
specific treatment of a lender's interest in and right to acceleration for
the purpose of increasing interest rates without regard to impairment
of the security.
Malouff v. Midland Federal Savings & Loan Association2 was a
case of first impression in Colorado. In 1966 Midland received a trust
deed from borrower, Gordon Price, securing a loan at 7%. In 1971,
Price attempted to sell the property to plaintiff, Virginia Malouff,
subject to the original mortgage, but could not obtain Midland's permis-
sion as required unless Malouff agreed to assume the mortgage at the
rate of 8%, which was about one percentage point below current
interest rates. Malouff refused; instead she sued for a temporary and
permanent injunction against Midland's threatened foreclosure, and for
a declaratory judgment that she was legally entitled to assume the
original loan. She prevailed in the trial court, which held that the ac-
celeration clause was an unlawful restraint on alienation, that it was too
vague and uncertain to be enforceable, and that the clause requiring
assumption could not be enforced.
In reversing, the Colorado Supreme Court, following Coast Bank
and its progeny, noted that the "question of the invalidity of a restraint
depends upon its reasonableness in view of the justifiable interests of
the parties."5 3 The court further held that "due-on-sale" clauses were
reasonable restraints on alienation, thus leaving the remaining inquiry
to be what conditions a lender may impose upon a vendee in return
for waiver of the acceleration clause.
One such condition a lender may validly impose is a higher
interest rate. In support of this holding the Malouff opinion exten-
51. Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 58 Wis. 2d 99, 205
N.W.2d 762, 767 (1973).
52. - Colo. -, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973).
53. Id. at 1243.
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sively quoted both Cherry5" and an affidavit submitted by a Midland
vice-president which described the risks encountered by a lender when
loan demand and money supply are out of balance. The affidavit read
in part:
As of November 30, 1971, Midland held 60,388 deposit ac-
counts. Midland used these accounts to make loans. Mid-
land must make loans at reasonable rates to its borrowers,
but it also has the responsibility to give its depositors a rea-
sonable rate of return on their deposits. A reasonable rate
of return on dollars invested in home loans is an interest rate
which is comparable to the current rate of return of the lend-
ing industry. Midland is willing to deal with 'the original bor-
rower on a long term basis, but not with any other party with-
out an opportunity to consider the substituted borrower and
current interest rates.
If lenders were unable to make some form of interest rate
adjustments on long-term loans, they would have to make
only short-term loans amortized over periods of less than ten
years. Original borrowers would not be able to pay off their
home purchases without having to refinance their indebted-
ness one or more -times in ,the process. Short-term loans
would also increase monthly payments and make the obtain-
ing of such loans prohibitive to many people.55
So the original borrower has the benefit of his bargain as long as he
holds the property, and the lender has the benefit of his bargained-
for right to increase the interest rate to current levels upon a sale or
an encumbrance intended as a sale. This is a reasonable protection
of a lender's justifiable interest and therefore does not constitute an
invalid restraint on alienation.
As to requiring assumption by the purchaser, the court stated:
Having found the clause to be a reasonable restraint, and
therefore valid, the agreement to forbear the exercise of the
right 'to accelerate constituted adequate consideration for
Malouff's undertaking to assume the unpaid indebtedness
and to pay the increased interest rate.56
Malouff builds directly on Cherry, recognizing that "due-on-sale'
clauses have at least two legitimate functions and that one of these-
54. The Malouff court quoted the language from Cherry which appears in the text
accompanying note 18 supra.
55. Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, - Colo. -, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973).
56. Id. at 1246. See also the unpublished opinion of Wilson v. Inland Mfg. Co.,
Civ. No. 8636 (4th Dist. Cal. filed Jan. 18, 1968).
19751
16
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 10 [1974], Iss. 4, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol10/iss4/8
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
raising interest rates-is an economic necessity operating without
violence to the legal principles of unconscionability, restraint on aliena-
tion, or public policy.
This comment's final case, Gunther v. White,17 litigated as its
central issue the question whether an acceleration provision is valid and
enforceable where the admitted motive for exercising the option is to
secure an increase in the rate of interest. It answered that question
in the affirmative. Tennessee law does not view an acceleration option
as a penalty or as a forfeiture which a court of equity should restrain:
[A] court of equity has the power to relieve a mortgagor
from the effect of an operative acceleration clause in a mort-
gage where that condition making the option operative is the
result of some unconscionable or inequitable conduct of the
mortgagee. No case has been found however, which holds
that the exercise of the option to gain the benefit of a current
interest rate falls into these categories.5"
Cherry was quoted extensively; then the court summarized its view
thusly:
Mhe situation here is simply that [borrowers] can sell their
property at a higher price if they can sell it at a lower inter-
est rate. The [lenders] under their contract have the right
to insist upon the repayment of their loan in the event of sale,
so that they can relend the money at an increased interest
rate, and so maintain their supply of lending money, at the
level of their present cost of such money. . . . [E]quity
should not depart from the law which requires it to enforce
valid contracts and strike down the acceleration option simply
because its exercise will let the [lender], not the borrower,
make the profit on the interest rate occasioned by the in-
creased cost of money.59
IMPACT OF FEDERAL LAW
The cases that have just been examined were selected because
they best illustrated the course of development in their respective jur-
isdictions. Until very recently, this development was strictly a state
matter. However the federal government, acting through the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), on March 19, 1974, published a
regulation, T 56,60 binding upon all federally chartered savings and
57. 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973).
58. Id. at 531.
59. Id. at 532.
60. T 56 Installment Loan: Restrictive proviso reads as follows:
Increases in mortgage interest rates by federally chartered associations which
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loan associations. This regulation could have far reaching and poten-
tially drastic effects upon the continued effectiveness of acceleration
devices. Presently there are approximately 2,050 federally chartered
savings and loan associations compared with 3,400 which are state
chartered.
T 56's major impact will be on loans given on or after April 10,
1972. In jurisdictions which enforce acceleration clauses (or "escala-
tion clauses" as used in T 56) to increase interest rates, T 56 requires
that any increase be enforced in such a way as will not increase monthly
payments.61 In effect then, each monthly payment for loans on or after
the cut-off date must remain equal to or less than the first payment.
This means that savings and loan associations are only able to benefit
from interest rate increases by extending the loan maturity date.
Savings and loans are, however, restricted by law to certain maximum
maturity limits62 and herein lies the problem.
The question arises: just what does T 56 mean by the phrase
"may only extend the maturity of the loan up to the maximum term
permissible for the type of loan involved"? Is the maximum period
to be computed from the date of the original loan or from the date of
assumption? In exploring the possible interpretations, a conventional
home mortgage with its legal maximum maturity of thirty years will be
used for illustration.
result from the exercise of rights for association under escalation clauses in
loan contracts and other debt instruments have been questioned because of the
proviso in the above regulation. Since April 10, 1972, the proviso has ex-
pressly prohibited any subsequent monthly payment of principal and interest
on an installment loan from exceeding any such preceding payment.
It has been determined, with the concurrence of the Board, as to:
Loans made prior to April 10, 1972, that Federal associations may, within
the original loan term, exercise their contractual right to increase the interest
rate of a loan under an escalation clause contained in the loan contract or
other debt instrument. In the alternative, the monthly payment may be in-
creased and maturity of the loan may be extended up to the maximum term
permissible for the type of loan involved to the extent necessary to absorb
the increase in interest charged.
Loans made on or after April 10, 1972, the effective date of the most recent
amendment of Section 541.14, that Federal associations exercising their
rights under such clauses, may only extend the maturity of the loan up to
the maximum term permissible for the type of loan involved to the extent
necessary to absorb the increase in interest rate, provided that the monthly
payment (of principal and interest) is not increased.
61. 12 C.F.R. § 541.14 (1974):
(a) Installment loan. The term "installment loan" means any loan re-
payable in regular periodic payments sufficient to retire the debt, interest and
principal, within the loan term. However, no required payment after the first
payment shall be more, but may be less, than any preceding payment.
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A. Maturity Extensions Figured from-Date of Assumption
This possibility presents the fewest problems and gives both
lenders and borrowers the greatest measure of freedom. With exten-
sions computed from the date of the assumption the assumption agree-
ment could be treated as if it were a new mortgage. For example;
an original mortgage of $30,000 at 7.5% interest, with a twenty year
maturity, would have monthly payments of $241.68. After six years
the unpaid principal would be $24,129.39, so that an assumption at that
point 63 could be made at 9% (assuming that was the current rate at
the time of assumption), while keeping the monthly payment at
$241.68 as required by T 56, but the new maturity period would now
be fifteen years five months, instead of the fourteen years remaining
under the original agreement. It might even be possible to reduce
monthly payments upon assumption; an appealing prospect considering
inflation-strained budgets. If the assuming vendee in the example
above wished to assume at a lower monthly payment it could be done
on the following terms: unpaid principal-still $24,129.39; hypotheti-
cal current interest rate-still 9%; maturity-extended to the maxi-
mum of thirty years; which yields a monthly payment of $194.15, com-
pared to $241.68.
It must be noted however, that if the original maturity is close to
the maximum allowed by law, the lender will be unable to raise
interest rates appreciably until a substantial portion of the original debt
is amortized. This is because nearly all the money paid on a mortgage
in the first few years is applied to pay the accrued interest first leaving
very little to be applied to reduce the principal.04 Table 1 shows the
maximum interest rate a lender could charge by extending maturities
to the maximum thirty years, as a function of amortization. Data is
based on an assumption of an original mortgage of $30,000.00 at 7.5%
interest, for thirty years, which would yield a monthly payment of
$209.76.
63. This and the following examples assume any appreciation in value will be ab-
sorbed in the down payment.
64. For example in the illustration above of a $30,000 mortgage at 7.5% interest
with a twenty year maturity, the total yearly payment will be $2,900.16. Of this sum
$2,231.37 is allocated to payment of interest leaving only $668.79 to amortize the prin-
ciple in the first year.
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TABLE 15
Number of Years Unpaid Max. Rate Yearly %
Before Assumption Principal Chargeable* Increase*
0 $30,000.00 7.50%
1 29,747.35 7.59 .09%
2 29,451.24 7.69 .10
3 29,123.16 7.80 .11
4 28,788.29 7.93 .13
5 28,417.72 8.06 .13
6 28,018.39 8.21 .15
7 27,588.06 8.38 .17
8 27,124.32 8.56 .18
9 26,624.57 8.77 .21
10 26,086.03 8.99 .22
11 25,505.68 9.26 .27
* Rounded to nearest .01%
In the example upon which the data in Table 1 is based, a fed-
erally chartered savings and loan association would be unable to boost
interest rates to a current higher level (say 9%) unless sufficient
amortization (at least ten years worth if lender wanted to charge 9%)
had occurred, if the original maturity period were the maximum legal
limit or close to it. This result could cause federally chartered savings
and loans to give mortgages only with maturities somewhat less than
the legal limit.
B. Maturity Extensions Figured from Date of Original Loan
A result of this interpretation would be an end to the thirty year
mortgage from federal savings and loans, for no extension would be
allowed on a loan whose original maturity period was the legal limit.
Shorter loans would have built-in extension margins to the extent their
maturities were below the maximum period allowed, but as a direct
consequence, borrowers would have to make higher monthly payments,
tending in turn to discourage borrowing.
Another pernicious side-effect of computing permissible T 56
extensions from the date of the original mortgage is the intra-industry
competition generated between state chartered and federally chartered
savings and loan associations. In the absence of similar state legisla-
tion, state chartered savings and loans will continue to be able not only
to extend maturities, but also to continue to operate without restrictions
limiting increases in monthly payments. By fostering unhealthy and
unfair competition, the industry as a whole is weakened.
65. The author gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness to Mike Baugh, a pe-
troleum engineer, without whose patience and interest the data in this table and in the
foregoing examples would have been much harder to have obtained, and to the Amerada
Hess Corp. for the generous use of their computer facilities.
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To the best of the author's knowledge, only one of the FHLBB's
twelve district banks, has had a formal request for a T 56 clarification.06
In response to this request the FHLBB ruled that T 56 requires exten-
sions to be computed from the date of the original mortgage! It is hard
to imagine a decision less in keeping with the board's purposes---"to
encourage thrift and economical home ownership .... ,617 This inter-
pretation, by tightly restricting extension, denies to the lender the
benefits of increased interest rates provided by acceleration clauses.
Continuing unprofitability of unextendable loans (including those
whose extension period is so short that no appreciable rate increase is
possible) becomes a powerful impetus to lenders to compensat by
charging new borrowers ever higher rates.
Any revision of the FHLBB's disappointing position must, how-
ever, await a formal challenge to its present interpretation. But it is
hoped that when and if such a challenge occurs the board will reverse
its ruling and take a stand in favor of the manifold advantages available
to both lenders and borrowers in allowing extensions to be computed
from the date of assumption.
CONCLUSION
This comment has traced the judicial treatment of the "due-on-
sale" and "due-on-encumbrance" acceleration devices from their tradi-
tional purpose-protecting a lender's security-to their second and
equally valid function-adjusting interest rates upward to the extent
sales or encumbrances intended as sales occur. "Due-on" clauses were
originally created during times of stable interest rates for the purpose
of diminishing a lender's moral risks. Now, in a time of volatile interest
rates, to deny them validity as economic safety valves because of their
single-minded origin is to thwart the essential process of legal evolution.
The law must be responsive to changing needs. Many sound legal and
economic arguments, rooted in our recent and recurring economic
instability, support the use of "due-on" clauses as rate adjusters. The
formalistic approach of the minority rule requires over-rigid adherence
to equity principles while ignoring economic imperatives. The majority
rule balances economic necessity with preservation of the legal princi-
66. The inquiry originated with First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Little Rock,
Ark. In the opinion of William 0. Churchill, Associate Supervisor of the Federal Home
Loan Bank at Little Rock, whom the author interviewed, this was the first request for
a T 56 clarification to be received by any FHLBB district.
67. UNrrFD STATEs Gov'T MANuAL at 452.
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ples of reasonableness and freedom from absolute restraints upon
alienation to reach the following conclusions:
(a) some form of rate adjustment is an essential factor in hold-
ing down interest rates and in insuring the continued viability
of long-term lenders;
(b) "due-on' clauses perform well the rate adjusting function;
(c) "due-on-sale" and "due-on-encumbrance" (when the encum-
brance is intended as a sale) are valid and enforceable and
are not restraints on alienation nor against public policy;
(d) a lender may accelerate solely to increase interest rates upon
the happening of the triggering event without allegation or
proof of waste or of depreciation; and
(e) "due-on-sale" clauses should be enforceable automatically,
provided rates are not raised above current levels.
Acceleration clauses are not perfect. They can only upgrade a lending
portfolio to the extent sales occur, but until they are replaced by some
other rate adjusting device6s acceleration clauses must be accorded the
validity and enforceability essential to their functioning.
It is vital therefore, for jurisdictions which have not yet litigated
or are in the process of litigating the validity of "due-on" clauses, 69 that
their economic importance not be overlooked to the detriment of both
lenders and new borrowers alike.
68. Of the alternative methods of rate adjustment the most popular and promising
is the "variable rate mortgage" (VRM) which provides for periodic increases or de-
creases in mortgage rates as the cost of credit rises and falls.
69. The "due-on" issue is currently in the trial stage in Oklahoma. See Continental
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